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THE EUROPEANISATION OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 
IN THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF EUROPE: SOME 
OBSERVATIONS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCE OF THE EU-15
Monica Claes*  
Summary: In the process of European integration, national constitu-
tional law remains crucial, in several respects. The EU Constitution, in 
its broadest sense, builds on the common constitutional traditions and 
principles of the Member States, and EU law refers back to national 
constitutional law in many ways. National constitutional law contrib-
utes to constitutionalising the EU, to give it legitimacy, and to ensure 
that the EU and the Member States as its agents continue to com-
ply with fundamental constitutional requirements, such as the rule of 
law, democracy and accountability, and the protection of fundamental 
rights. Also, from the national perspective, national constitutional law 
remains essential, since it provides the foundation of membership of 
the EU, it is decisive for the procedures to be followed when powers 
are transferred at times of accession and Treaty amendment, and it 
serves to provide the connection between the national and the EU le-
gal orders. Participation in the EU requires adaptation of the national 
constitutional arrangements, and national constitutions should not be 
neglected in the process of the constitutionalisation of Europe. This 
paper looks into the national constitutional experience of the EU-15 
with the EU and asks whether lessons can be learned for candidate 
countries. 
Constitutions1 are, in all Member States, considered to be the high-
est norm in the hierarchy of legal norms. They are the source of public 
power, constitute the polity and its organs, they organise and prescribe 
the exercise of state power, as well as its limits. Membership of the Eu-
ropean Union does not, in most Member States, change that dogma: the 
Constitution continues to apply as the highest norm, even when powers 
*  Monica Claes is Professor of Constitutional Law at Tilburg University (the Netherlands).
1  Constitutions come in many guises, as does the meaning of the concept ‘Constitution’. In 
this article I will use the term Constitution (capital ‘c’) for the constitutional document, and 
constitution (small ‘c’) for the broader concept of fundamental norms, rules and practices 
which are considered constitutional. 
2 Monica Claes: The Europeanisation of National Constitutions in the Constitutionalisation...
are transferred to the European level or when sovereignty is limited. The 
Constitution may be re-interpreted, it may be amended, and its imple-
mentation or concretisation may be adapted, but in the end the Constitu-
tion remains at the apex of the hierarchy of norms. Even more, the Con-
stitution is from the national perspective the source of EU membership, 
and it is only because, and insofar as, the Constitution allows it to, that 
European law can be operative in the national legal order. In other words, 
national constitutional supremacy continues to be the leading starting 
point in most Member States.2 Nevertheless, it would be erroneous and 
misleading to maintain that membership of the EU does not affect the 
national Constitution and its functioning. It is hard to pretend that the 
Constitution continues to apply as it did before membership, and that 
the constitutional norms and arrangements remain unaffected. National 
constitutional supremacy is nowhere absolute, and all national Consti-
tutions and constitutional arrangements undergo some change. The real 
question, then, is how those responsible for the national Constitution 
and its interpretation (the Constitution-maker or the constitutional leg-
islature, the constitutional courts, the people in a referendum, and all 
actors contributing to the functioning of the Constitution) have reacted 
to the incoming tide of European law. In some Member States, the text 
of the national Constitution has been amended in order to allow for the 
transfer of powers to the European Union, to comply with the require-
ments of membership, or in order to adjust the concrete constitutional 
arrangements to the new circumstances. Other Constitutions have not 
been amended as such, but their interpretation has been adjusted, or the 
rules relating to the functioning of the Constitution have been amended, 
and constitutional practice has changed.  
To a certain extent, the EU is indifferent to national Constitutions. 
Given the international law origins of the EU, Member States are, to some 
extent, black boxes, and the constitutional veil is often not pierced. Thus, 
2  This may be different in the Netherlands, where European law, as all international treaties 
which are binding, take precedence over all national law, including the Constitution. This is 
a precedence of application, rather than validity. It is the Constitution itself, which awards 
such precedence (through the combined application of Article 94 which awards precedence 
to provisions of international treaties which are binding, and Article 120 which precludes 
judges from reviewing the constitutionality of statutes and treaties). Nevertheless, scholars 
disagree on the issue of hierarchy of norms, and of ultimate authority. According to some, 
EC law ranks above the Constitution and all national law, not because of Article 94 of the 
Constitution, but because of the nature of Community law. Article 94 accordingly does not 
apply to Community law, and EC law outranks the Constitution. Others claim that ultimate 
authority lies with the Constitution, which is accordingly the highest norm of the land, but 
which, under Article 94 of the Constitution, allows for the application, with priority, of Com-
munity law. Most authors would agree that in the end, the question of which ranks higher, 
the Constitution or Community law, does not matter for practical purposes, because either 
way the result is the precedence of Community law. 
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it does not matter to EU law whether a State is centralised or federal; it 
does not matter whether it opts for majority or proportional representa-
tion in parliamentary elections; it does not matter whether a Member 
State has a parliamentary or (semi-) presidential system of government. 
To a certain extent, EU law does not look ‘inside’ the State, and obliga-
tions are imposed on ‘the State’ as such. This does not mean that nation-
al Constitutions are irrelevant to the EU and EU law. Quite the contrary: 
national Constitutions continue to matter, and matter a great deal, from 
a European perspective, too. The national Constitutions provide the very 
foundation of the Treaties, which must be ratifi ed in accordance with 
the national constitutional requirements (Article 48 EU). As such, they 
supply legitimacy to the EU Treaties and to the EU. The EU treaties and 
EU law in several instances link in with the national Constitutions, and 
refer back to them, often explicitly, sometimes implicitly. Sometimes EU 
law refers back to common constitutional traditions or principles, and 
sometimes to the Constitution of each of the Member States taken on its 
own. 
National Constitutions are highly relevant to the EU, and have an 
important role to give legitimacy and constitutional values in the Europe-
an Union. National Constitutions are key in increasing constitutionalism 
in the context of the EU, at both national and European level. The Eu-
ropean Constitution can best be described as a composite constitution, 
in which national Constitutions must be considered elements of the EU 
Constitution. In this paper, I will make some observations on the role of 
national Constitutions in European integration, and on the relationship 
between national and European Constitutions and constitutionalism, in 
the light of the experience of the EU-15, ie the ‘old’ Member States. The 
restriction to the ‘old’ Member States has nothing to do with a hierarchy 
in terms of importance or infl uence. The reasons are far more banal, and 
have to do mainly with my own limitations as a researcher, due to restric-
tions of time, space and linguistic knowledge. 
Before embarking upon the exercise, some remarks are in place con-
cerning the relationship between the national Constitutions and the EU 
Constitution in general (1). Indeed, thinking about the European Con-
stitution, which is a composite constitution, requires refl ection on the 
relationship between the national Constitutions and the EU Constitution 
in its broadest sense. That is a balancing act, like walking a tight rope. 
The art is to fi nd the correct balance between taking Europe seriously in 
the national Constitution and taking the Constitution seriously in par-
ticipating in the European project. Then (2) I will offer a bird’s-eye view of 
the constitutional approach to Europe in the EU-15, and indicate which 
type of constitutional provisions have been adopted over the years in the 
constitutional texts (3).
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1. Some preliminary remarks
‘Primacy’ will not do
Now, the development of European constitutional law raises the 
question of the relationship between the European Constitution and the 
national Constitutions of the Member States.3 This relationship can be 
looked at from the national perspective, from the European perspective, 
or by adopting an outside view. The national and orthodox European 
perspectives often get stuck in fairly straightforward and simple stances 
based on some version of supremacy. From the European perspective, 
European law is considered to take precedence over all national law, in-
cluding the national Constitution, which must always give way to the 
supreme provisions of European law, however framed.4 Supremacy, then, 
is absolute and unconditional; it is ruthless and pays no respect to na-
tional constitutional law. From the national perspective, it is the national 
Constitution which remains at the apex of the legal hierarchy, and which 
retains its supremacy in the land, also over European law. Consequently, 
the latter cannot be applied when it confl icts with the core principles of 
the national Constitution. In reality, neither of these uni-dimensional 
approaches is as strict or ruthless as just presented. The primacy of 
Community law over national law, also from the perspective of the ECJ, 
goes hand in hand with the development of general principles, which 
perform the protective functions of the national Constitutions, translated 
and lifted to a European level. Likewise, even in Member States where it 
is claimed that Community law does not enjoy unconditional supremacy, 
it is applied mostly with precedence over primary legislation and also 
mostly over the national Constitution, while only the core principles are 
exempted from the primacy of European law.5 In addition, primacy in the 
case of confl ict is only one aspect of a much wider interaction between 
national constitutional and European law. Primacy sets in only once the 
treaties or the law deriving from them have entered into force. It only 
concerns the priority of the application of one norm where two collide. In 
other words, ‘primacy’ is in many cases merely a rule of collision. Primacy 
of one over the other cannot answer many of the much more intricate 
questions about the relationship between Europe and the national Con-
3  For a particularly negative response to the question, suggesting that the planned use of 
constitutional language has a destructive effect on the Member States and their Constitu-
tions, see P Kirchhof, ‘The Legal Structure of the European Union as a Union of States’ in 
A von Bogdandy and J Bast, Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2005) 765.
4  The landmark case here is Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 
1125.
5  For an overview and analysis of the case law in eight Member States, see Monica Claes, 
The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006).
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stitution and about the adaptation of constitutional arrangements in the 
context of the EU.
Constitutional Pluralism
The more modern accounts of the nature of the European legal order, 
of European constitutionalism and its relationship with national Consti-
tutions, are phrased in terms of some form of pluralism. These pluralist 
conceptions have been formulated as a response to the unsettled dilemma 
which arises if one stands by a uni-dimensional view (national or Euro-
pean), based on primacy of one over the other. Indeed, the national and 
European perspectives, based on some form of ultimate authority and un-
conditional supremacy, seem inevitably to lead to confl ict or revolution.6 
One of the two orders claiming ultimate authority must, when it comes to 
collision, give way; if both stick to their claim for unconditional supremacy, 
confl ict is unavoidable. The alternative view of the current constitutional 
settlement is known under different guises: legal pluralism (Walker),7 mul-
tilevel constitutionalism (Pernice),8 contrapunctual law (Maduro),9 consti-
tutional tolerance (Weiler).10 What these authors have in common is that 
they have given up the search for the fi nal answer to the question of ulti-
mate authority, and with it, the quest for a fi nal arbiter. Both orders, the 
national constitutional order and the European constitutional order, are 
acknowledged and respected; no formal hierarchy exists among the ap-
plicable legal orders, and collisions are avoided through various forms of 
mutual tolerance or mutual respect. Confl ict is thus avoided and the daily 
routine can continue while the exceptional case of constitutional confl ict is 
left undecided and the issue of fi nal authority remains contested.
These approaches have the advantages of giving a much more nu-
anced view, empirically and normatively. Nevertheless, the downside of 
these new approaches may be that while they aim to achieve a harmoni-
ous view of co-existing constitutions by avoiding the question of ultimate 
authority, they still tend to overstress the autonomy and separateness of 
the constitutional orders, national and European respectively. The ensu-
ing question of the relationship between these autonomous legal orders 
6  See Diarmiud Rossa Phelan, Revolt or Revolution: The Constitutional Boundaries of the 
European Community (Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, Dublin 1997). 
7  Neil Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 59 MLR 517.
8  Ingolf Pernice, ‘Multi-level Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European 
Constitution Making Revisited?’ (1999) 36 CML Rev 703-750.
9  Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Ac-
tion’ in Neil Walker, Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2003) 501-537.
10  JHH Weiler, ‘In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Sonderweg’ in Marlene Wind and 
JHH Weiler, European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (University Press, Cambridge) 
7-26.
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is ultimately left unresolved. Accordingly, these views should be further 
refi ned, and the emphasis should be less on separateness and autonomy 
of constitutional orders. Instead, the focus should be on the deep inter-
twinement and mutual dependency of legal orders. Under the view of the 
mixed or composite Constitution,11 the European and national Constitu-
tions are truly intertwined and interrelated. The European Constitution 
is made up of arrangements, rules and principles at the European level, 
completed with national arrangements, rules and values. The other way 
round, the national Constitution is to be regarded as a composite consti-
tution as well, made up of national and European building blocks. The 
focus is not on levels, but on elements of a composite constitution, in 
which national and European systems partake. Lines between national 
and European blocks are crossed, levels are shifted. Admittedly, this is 
not a radical shift of paradigm. It is a correction and perhaps a sophisti-
cation of the pluralist views of European constitutionalism. Traces of it 
can be found in European constitutional principles and provisions in the 
Treaty, as well as in the case law of the Court of Justice, and in the more 
recent constitutional practice.12 Institutionally also, the pluralist dimen-
sion is refl ected in a ‘thick pattern of “bridging mechanisms” linking the 
legal and political organs, procedures and tasks of the European site to 
national sites’.13 For instance, in the absence of decentralised European 
courts, the national courts operate as common European courts; national 
parliaments participate in monitoring law-making at the European level 
and by holding to account the national representatives in the European 
institutions, and indeed these very institutions themselves; national gov-
ernments, administrations and independent agencies are interlocked in 
formal and informal ways and networks. The consequence of such a view 
is that national Constitutions are crucial not only for each Member State 
taken on its own, but for the enhancement of constitutionalism at the 
European level as well. Full compliance with constitutional norms and 
the principles of constitutionalism can only be achieved through interac-
tion and mutual reinforcement. It also means that it can be argued that 
the Member States and national constitutional legal systems have a re-
sponsibility not only towards their own legal order, but towards the EU 
legal order as well. 
11  See eg Leonard Besselink, ‘National Parliaments in the EU’s Composite Constitution. 
A Plea for a Shift of Paradigm’ in Ph Kiiver (ed), National and Regional Parliaments in the 
European Constitutional Order (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 2006) 115-131. For a 
similar view, see Jacques Ziller, ‘National Constitutional Concepts in the New Constitution 
for Europe’ (2005) 1 EuConst 247-271 and 452-480.
12  This is developed further below.
13  See also Neil Walker, ‘Migration of Constitutional Ideas and the Migration of the Con-
stitutional Idea: The Case of the EU’ in S Choudhry, The Migration of Constitutional Ideas 
(CUP, Cambridge 2006) 216, 319-320.
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The European Union and national Constitutions from a European 
perspective 
Before embarking on an analysis of the prevailing national consti-
tutional approach to Europe in the EU-15, some remarks must be made 
about the European perspective on national constitutional law. As previ-
ously said, the orthodox and ruthless version of unconditional and abso-
lute EU law supremacy over the national Constitution, as well as the view 
that national Constitutions are in a sense irrelevant to the EU, does not 
do justice to the much more nuanced current stance of European law with 
regard to the national Constitutions. European law does, in fact, take ac-
count of those Constitutions, and of national constitutional diversity. 
First, the European Treaties refer back to the national constitutional 
provisions on the occasion of Treaty amendment (Article 48 EU) and the 
accession of new Member States (Article 49). Such Treaties require rati-
fi cation by all Member States ‘in accordance with their respective con-
stitutional requirements’. Given its international law origins and in the 
absence of a pouvoir constituant européen or a European constitutional 
legislature, the European Union is based on international treaties con-
cluded among States, and the EU remains dependent, for the adoption 
of its constitutional documents, on the ratifi cation procedure in accord-
ance with the constitutional provisions of the Member States. As a conse-
quence, formal Constitution-making, at the stage of ratifi cation, is decen-
tralised, and no European rules apply to this phase of European Consti-
tution-making. The only European requirement at this stage is that the 
Member States must ratify ‘in accordance with their constitutional re-
quirements’. This is fi rst and foremost a procedural requirement, stating 
that Member States must follow the procedures as provided for by their 
respective constitutions. Yet, could it not be argued that these provisions 
contain a substantive element as well? Could it not also be taken to mean 
that the Member States are under a treaty obligation to ensure harmony 
between the national Constitution and the treaties to be ratifi ed, and to 
ensure that their constitutional system is adapted if necessary? Once the 
treaty has entered into force, national law cannot be invoked as justifi -
cation for failure to perform a treaty, as is also the case under interna-
tional law on treaties.14 This is the traditional principle of the primacy of 
international treaties in international law, at the international level. And 
before the Treaty enters into force, EU law cannot impose any obligations 
on a Member State (or a candidate) to conduct specifi c constitutional 
amendments. It is, in fact, for each Member State to ascertain whether it 
is constitutionally possible to ratify a particular treaty, or to join a par-
ticular international organisation, or to decide that such ratifi cation or 
14  See also Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
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accession must be preceded by constitutional amendment. At this stage, 
Member States, acting through their constitutional courts or otherwise, 
are allowed to review the constitutionality of the treaties to be signed 
and ratifi ed.15 The better option obviously is to ensure, before ratifi cation 
or accession, that any incompatibilities between the Constitution and 
Treaty are removed. Yet, in principle, EU law does not legally preclude 
a Member State from concluding a treaty which does not comply with 
its constitutional provisions.16 On the other hand, the existing Treaties 
do contain certain constitutional standards (Article 6 EU, Article 49 EU) 
which must be met before the treaties can be signed and ratifi ed. In this 
sense, constitutional reform may become part of the negotiations, even if 
the concrete implementation remains national. 
Second, compliance with certain fundamental constitutional prin-
ciples is a condition for membership of the EU. Under Article 49 EU, 
‘Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) 
may apply to become a member of the Union’. Under Article 6 EU, ‘The 
Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law principles 
which are common to the Member States.’ This condition does not fade 
away upon accession, but continued compliance with these principles is 
required. If a Member State should fail to comply with some of the consti-
tutional requirements of membership, more particularly those mentioned 
in Article 6 (1), sanctions can be imposed under Article 7 EU. But there 
is more. The EU Treaties and EU law start from a number of broader 
presumptions with respect to the national constitutional arrangements, 
rules and principles prevailing in the Member States, some explicit, some 
implicit. The EU presumes that the Member States are liberal democra-
cies, based on the rule of law; it presumes that fundamental rights are 
protected; it assumes that there are national parliaments, and that there 
are independent judiciaries. The EU’s own system of government is based 
on the assumption that the national governments are accountable for 
their European actions and inaction at the national level and before the 
national parliaments, which adduce elements of democratic accountabil-
ity of the European Union17 in addition to that provided by the European 
Parliament at the European level. 
15  On such an a priori or preventive review of the constitutionality of the EU Treaties, see 
Monica Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2006) chapter 15.
16  It will be pointed out below that the ratifi cation of the founding treaties by Belgium may 
well have been unconstitutional.
17  This is laid down very clearly in Article I-46 of the TECE: ‘Member States are represented 
in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their 
governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, 
or to their citizens’.
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Third, and contrary to what has just been said, to some extent the 
European Union is indifferent to the national constitutional arrangements 
prevailing in each Member State, as long as the European requirements 
are met and European law is complied with. This again has to do with 
the international law origins of the European Union as an international 
organisation based on an international treaty under the rules of interna-
tional treaty law. The EU is an organisation of States which to a certain 
extent remain black boxes. To the extent that the veil is not pierced, what 
happens within the State is for the constitutional law of the Member 
States to resolve. So, national constitutional law decides who approves 
and ratifi es the treaties and how; national law governs the distribution 
of labour between the federation and the federated entities in a federal 
state, and hence also which entity will transpose which directive. Euro-
pean law will review only that the end result is achieved, and that the 
European standards are met. 
A fourth element in the complex interrelationship between European 
and national constitutional law is the common constitutional traditions of 
the Member States. These are recognised as a source of Community gen-
eral principles under Article 6 EU and in the case law of the ECJ. Accord-
ing to the common perception, the ECJ developed this case law partly to 
alleviate the consequences of this absolute primacy of European law even 
over national constitutional principles and nationally protected funda-
mental rights.18 From these common constitutional traditions, together 
with the ECHR, the general principles of Community law are drawn, more 
specifi cally, the fundamental rights which the Union must respect. These 
general principles of Community law, in turn, are binding also on the 
Member States when acting within the scope of Community law. They 
can, under certain circumstances, be relied on as a matter of Commu-
nity law, by a Member State, in order to justify measures which would 
otherwise constitute a violation of Community law. This was the case, 
for instance, in Schmidberger,19 where the Court held that since both the 
Community and its Member States are required to respect fundamental 
rights, the protection of those rights is a legitimate interest which, in 
principle, justifi es a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community 
law, even under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such 
as the free movement of goods. Fundamental rights are thus drawn into 
the analysis of the rules on free movement, and can operate as a justifi -
cation for restrictions. Accordingly, the Austrian authorities were allowed 
to rely on the need to respect fundamental rights guaranteed by both the 
18  On this case law, see for instance Bruno De Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights’ in Ph Alston (ed), The EU and 
Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 1999) 859.
19  Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-0000.
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ECHR and the Austrian Constitution20 in deciding to allow a restriction to 
be imposed on one of the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty. 
Schmidberger concerned the right to freedom of expression and freedom 
of assembly, which is clearly common to the Member States, and laid 
down also in Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. 
Yet, and this brings us to a fi fth element, European law does accept 
and condone constitutional diversity, to a certain extent, and as a mat-
ter of Community law.21 European law does, in some circumstances, ac-
cept the specifi c national constitutional provisions or arrangements of a 
particular Member State, and this transpires in the case law of the ECJ. 
Cases in point are Omega22and Gibraltar.23 In the Omega case, the Court 
allowed the German Länder to let the right to human dignity outweigh 
the freedoms of the internal market.24 The question which arose before 
the German courts was whether the power of a Member State to restrict 
fundamental freedoms for reasons of public interests - in this case the 
protection of fundamental values, more particularly human dignity - was 
conditioned  by the existence of a legal conception common to all Member 
States. ‘Human dignity’ is widely recognised as a fundamental constitu-
tional principle forming the basis of human rights, and as a general prin-
ciple of Community law,25 but not as a separate justiciable fundamental 
right under the ECHR or in most Member States.  It is, however, under 
20  This reference by the ECJ to the Constitution of one Member State is remarkable, since 
it could also have referred to the usual ‘common constitutional traditions of the Member 
States’. Nevertheless, in its analysis the ECJ balanced the requirements of the protection 
of fundamental rights in the Community with those arising from a fundamental freedom 
enshrined in the Treaty, and apparently treated the fundamental right invoked as a com-
mon principle.
21  See more generally on fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms C. Kombos, ‘Fun-
damental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: A Symbiosis on the Basis of Subsidiarity’ 
(2006) 12 European Public Law 433; V. Skouris, ‘Fundamental Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms: The Challenge of Striking the Rights Balance’ (2006) European Business Law 
Rev 225. 
22  See, among many others, J Morijn, ‘Balancing Fundamental Rights and Common Mar-
ket Freedoms in Union Law: Schmidberger and Omega in the Light of the European Consti-
tution’ (2006) 12 ELJ 15; FB Search Term Begin Ronkes Agerbeek, Search Term End ‘Free-
dom of Expression and Free Movement in the Brenner Corridor, the Schmidberger Case’ 
(2004) 29 EL Rev 255; MK Bulterman, HR Kranenborg, ‘Case Comment:  What If Rules on 
Free Movement and Human Rights Collide? About Laser Games and Human Dignity: the 
Omega Case’ (2006) 31 EL Rev 93. 
23  Case C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom (Gibraltar) [2006] ECR I-0000.
24  Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeis-
terin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-0000; The Schmidberger case is less clear in this 
respect. The Austrian government had argued that it had allowed the blockade inspired by 
considerations linked to respect of fundamental rights enshrined in the ECHR and the Aus-
trian Constitution. The Court proceeded on the basis of the ECHR alone, without reference 
to the Austrian Constitution, see Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-0000.
25  Case C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-0000.
11CYELP 3 [2007] 1-38
the German Basic Law.  The Court held that, as a matter of principle, the 
objective of protecting human dignity was compatible with Community 
law, since it was to be considered a general principle of law also under 
Community law, drawing from the principles common to the Member 
States and the ECHR. The fact that the principle of respect for human 
dignity has a particular status as an independent fundamental right un-
der the German Basic Law was immaterial in this respect. The protection 
of fundamental rights was considered to be a legitimate interest which 
may justify a restriction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the EC 
Treaty, such as the freedom to provide services. Nevertheless, it was not 
indispensable for the restrictive measure to correspond to a conception 
shared by all Member States as regards the precise way in which the fun-
damental right or legitimate interest in question was to be protected. In 
the case at hand, the prohibition corresponded to the level of protection 
which the German Basic Law aimed to guarantee for Germany. The Court 
concluded that the measure was considered to be justifi ed under the 
Community provisions on free movement. The Court’s judgment hinges 
on two thoughts: one is the fi nding that the principle of human dignity is 
a common principle and hence was to be considered a legitimate interest 
which may justify restrictions to fundamental freedoms: commonality of 
the principle thus seemed to be crucial. Nevertheless, the Court then al-
lowed great leeway to each Member State as regards the precise way in 
which this principle was to be protected, and left the substantial test for 
the national court. The Court did not test whether the prohibition was 
really necessary under the German Constitution: it simply referred to the 
opinion of the referring judge. Yet, even then, the Court retains a super-
visory function in controlling whether a fair balance was struck between 
competing interests. 
In both cases, Omega and Schmidberger, the referring courts had 
signalled to the ECJ that a national constitutional fundamental right was 
at stake, and diametrically opposed European fundamental freedoms. In 
both cases, albeit in a somewhat different manner, the Court translated 
these national rights into Community principles, and hence re-phrased 
the issues from a confl ict between European freedom and national consti-
tutional rights, into a balancing of competing principles within the con-
text of European law. At the same time, the ECJ explicitly allowed for na-
tional diversity, albeit under the control of the ECJ.26 In Omega, the ECJ 
then left the actual balancing for the national court. As a consequence, 
the Court has the fi nal say in deciding whether a particular principle or 
right is to be considered a Community right, but it then allows a wide 
26  The Court did not make its test very specifi c: it did not exactly clarify whether it was 
applying a European test, or whether it was merely marginally appraising the application 
of the national test.
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margin of appreciation to the national courts for the actual balancing in 
the concrete case.   
In the recent Gibraltar case,27 the ECJ allowed the UK to grant elec-
toral rights in European elections to non-nationals and hence to non-EU 
citizens. Spain had brought an enforcement action against the UK under 
Article 227 EC, claiming, among other things, that by extending voting 
rights to non-EU-citizens, the UK had infringed the EC Treaty, since vot-
ing rights were conditional on citizenship of the Union. The ECJ rejected 
the Spanish claims, and held that the UK was entitled to extend voting 
rights in European elections. In the judgment, the ECJ paid particular 
attention to the fact that the UK also did so in national elections, and that 
the extension was fi rmly embedded in the UK’s constitutional traditions. 
Another element in this trend of paying regard to national constitu-
tional principles can be found in several pieces of secondary legislation, 
both directives and framework decisions. Several recent directives and 
framework decisions contain references to national constitutional rules 
in their recitals, stating that the relevant European legislation ‘does not 
prevent a Member State from applying [certain] constitutional rules.’28 It 
is not entirely clear what the meaning of these recitals is, and how they 
relate to the principle of primacy and the general principles of Community 
law. Indeed, all of the principles and freedoms mentioned (‘due process, 
freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of expression in 
other media’) are, at least at fi rst sight, common to all the Member States, 
and qualify as general principles of Community law. The need to refer to 
national constitutional rules thus seems obsolete. Also, it is not clear how 
such references to national constitutional rules can have a practical ef-
fect: can they, for instance, be invoked before the ECJ, or before national 
courts, in order to escape the application of the directives or the imple-
menting legislation? Do they create exceptions to the general principle of 
primacy? There may be some interesting cases ahead in this context. 
27  Case C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom (Gibraltar) [2006] ECR I-0000.
28  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest 
Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, recital 12: ‘This Frame-
work Decision does not prevent a Member State from applying its constitutional rules relat-
ing to due process, freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of expression 
in other media’; Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to confi scation orders, recital 14: ‘This 
Framework Decision does not prevent any Member State from applying its constitutional 
rules relating to due process, freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of 
expression in other media’; Commission Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006 imple-
menting Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards 
organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment fi rms and defi ned 
terms for the purposes of that Directive, recital 80:  ‘this Directive does not in any way pre-
vent Member States from applying their constitutional rules relating to freedom of the press 
and freedom of expression in the media’. 
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To sum up, the relationship between European law and national 
constitutional law is much more complex than is often suggested by ref-
erence to a principle of primacy.29 National Constitutions do not disap-
pear in the presence of European law. Quite the contrary, they are vital 
in as much as the European Constitution is an incremental and partial 
constitution, which operates concomitantly with the national Constitu-
tions. National constitutional law and constitutional law at the European 
level together form the composite constitution of the European Union. 
The complex relationship between the national and European elements 
of this composite constitution cannot be captured in terms of primacy or 
of the supremacy of one over the other. Nevertheless, European law does 
pose requirements to national Constitutions, which must sometimes be 
adapted to membership. 
2. What role for national Constitutions in the EU? A bird’s-eye view30
What, then, is the role of national Constitutions and national consti-
tutional law in the context of the EU? What are they for? And what can be 
learned from the experience of the EU-15? The diffi culty in answering the 
last question is that each Member State, of course, has its own particular 
constitutional law, not only in terms of substance, history and context, 
but with regard to its own style and traditions (What is considered to 
be constitutional? How and in what form should it be formalised, if at 
all?). Each Member State has its own rules and traditions with respect to 
the role of the respective constitutional actors (Who makes and develops 
the Constitution? Who is responsible for its content and change?), and 
its own constitutional discourse. Consequently, the answer to the ques-
tions just asked (what is the Constitution for in the context of the EU, 
and what is best practice?) cannot be given. Thinking about the relation-
ship between national constitutional law and EU law is distinctly na-
tional, and coloured by the specifi c national context, the legal doctrines, 
practices, sensitivities and traditions, by scholarship and sometimes co-
incidence. Some Member States have considered it necessary to adopt 
special constitutional provisions dealing with the constitutional condi-
tions and national constitutional consequences of membership. Others 
29  J Wouters, ‘National Constitutions and the European Union’ (2000) 1Legal Issues of Eu-
ropean Integration 25, if not recent, offers a thorough account of the various elements of the 
wider issue of the relationship between national Constitutions and the European Union.
30  This section draws on Monica Claes, ‘Constitutionalizing Europe at its Source: The “Eu-
ropean Clauses” in the National Constitutions: Evolution and Typology’ (2005) Yearbook of 
European Law 81; see also Christoph Grabenwarter, ‘National Constitutional Law Relating 
to the European Union’ in A von Bogdandy and J Bast, Principles of European Constitutional 
Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005) 95; Alfred Kellerman, Jaap W de Zwaan and J Czuczai 
(eds), EU Enlargement. The Constitutional Impact at EU and National Level (TMC Asser Press, 
The Hague 2001); National Reports from the XXth FIDE Congress, London, on Topic I: Eu-
ropean Law and National Constitutions (BIICL, London 2002).
14 Monica Claes: The Europeanisation of National Constitutions in the Constitutionalisation...
assume that membership does not require specifi c Europe provisions, 
as it can be fi tted into the prevailing constitutional rules and principles. 
Nevertheless, some trends can be detected when analysing the national 
constitutional reaction to EU membership. Also, this is an area in which 
constitutional ideas seem to migrate easily among Member States.31 Yet, 
especially as concerns the constitutional texts, there remains a large va-
riety of approaches.
In what follows, I will look into the constitutional approach to the EU 
in the ‘old Europe’, and see whether lessons can be drawn from it for the 
candidate countries. There are three issues involved when approaching 
the question, and I will touch upon all of them. First, there is the ques-
tion of constitutional texts and constitutional drafting: is EU membership 
mentioned in the text of the Constitution and has the Constitution been 
adapted to participation in the European Union? Second, whether or not 
a Member State has thought it necessary to adapt the constitutional texts 
to membership of the Union and, irrespective of the manner chosen, it 
is important to take note of the actual constitutional practice. In some 
Member States, the constitutional texts have been amended to introduce 
constitutional change, but practice does not follow. On the other hand, it 
may well be that the constitutional texts make no reference whatsoever 
to the EU, but constitutional practice has adapted to the new realities. 
Constitutional change is sometimes also attained by amendment of the 
Rules of Procedure, the Committee structure in Parliament, etc. Third, 
in many Member States, especially those with strong legally and socially 
embedded constitutional courts, (constitutional) case law has played an 
important role in conceptualising the relationship between the national 
constitutional order and the European Union. The constitutional con-
sequences of membership have to a large extent been a matter for the 
courts rather than for the constitutional legislature. This is not neces-
sarily a bad thing and it is how constitutional law develops and oper-
ates. Nevertheless, one may wonder whether these types of fundamental 
questions are fi rst and foremost for the courts to answer. Guaranteeing 
respect for the constitution and for the values underlying it is not the 
sole responsibility of the courts: they cooperate with the political actors. 
In particular, the constitutional legislature has the duty to ensure that 
national constitutionalism can be achieved upon joining the EU.32 
31  On the migration of constitutional ideas from the Member States to the EU, see N Walk-
er, ‘The Migration of Constitutional Ideas and the Migration of the Constitutional Idea: the 
Case of the EU’ in S Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (CUP, Cambridge 
2006) 316. I am here looking at the horizontal migration of national constitutional ap-
proaches to the EU.
32  See Monica Claes, The European Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2006) 650; Anneli Albi, ‘Supremacy of EC Law in the New Member 
States. Bringing Parliaments into the Equation of “Co-operative Constitutionalism”’ (2007) 
3 EuConst 25. 
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a. An unprincipled beginning
The six founding Member States33
In fi ve of the six founding Member States, the Constitution explicitly 
provided for the possibility to transfer certain sovereign powers to interna-
tional organisations, or to limit sovereignty. Yet none of the Constitutions 
of these founding Member States were amended with a view specifi cally to 
ratify the European treaties. The French Constitution of 1946,34 and the 
Italian35 and German36 post-War Constitutions, all included commitments 
to international cooperation and integration. The Constitution of the Neth-
erlands was amended to include a transfer of powers provision in 1953, 
because the constitutional legislature was of the opinion that there would 
be frequent recourse to this type of transfer in the future.37 The Belgian 
Constitution was the odd one out. The original treaties were ratifi ed by Bel-
gium without a constitutional provision allowing a transfer to international 
organisations. However, given the article stating that ‘All powers stem from 
the Nation and are to be exercised in accordance with this Constitution’, 
Belgian membership of the European Communities was considered to be 
unconstitutional. Given the wide political support for membership and the 
absence of a constitutional court, this never gave rise to legal and constitu-
tional problems, and the situation was mended when a transfer of powers 
provision was introduced in 1970, twelve years into membership.38 
33  See eg Bruno De Witte, ‘Constitutional Aspects of European Union Membership in the 
Original Six Member States: Model Solutions for the Applicant Countries?’ in Alfred Keller-
man, Jaap W de Zwaan and J Czuczai (eds), EU Enlargement. The Constitutional Impact at 
EU and National Level (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2001) 65.
34  S. 15 of the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution: ‘Subject to reciprocity, France shall con-
sent to the limitations upon its sovereignty necessary to the organization and preservation 
of peace’. 
35  Article 11 of the Italian Constitution: ‘Italy repudiates war as an instrument offending 
the liberty of the peoples and as a means for settling international disputes; it agrees to 
limitations of sovereignty where they are necessary to allow for a legal system of peace and 
justice between nations, provided the principle of reciprocity is guaranteed; it promotes and 
encourages international organizations furthering such ends’. 
36  Article 24(1) of the 1949 Basic Law: ‘(1) The Federation may, by legislation, transfer sov-
ereign powers (“Hoheitsrechte”) to international institutions’.
37  The Dutch provision was inserted with a view to the European Defence Community 
(which ultimately did not pass the vote in the French Assemblée). The provision, now num-
bered Article 92, reads: ‘Legislative, executive and judicial powers may be conferred on 
international institutions by or pursuant to a treaty, subject, where necessary, to the provi-
sions of Article 91 paragraph 3’. See, on the history of the Dutch provision, Monica Claes 
and Bruno De Witte, ‘Report on the Netherlands’ in JHH Weiler, Anne Marie Slaughter and 
Alec Stone Sweet (eds), The European Courts and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurispru-
dence (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1998).
38  Article 25bis (following the provision that ‘All powers stem from the Nation’) provides: 
‘The exercising of determined power can be attributed by a treaty or by a law to interna-
tional public institutions’.
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Out of the six founding Member States, only one, Luxembourg, did 
not ratify in accordance with the usual constitutional provisions on the 
ratifi cation of ordinary international treaties. In Luxembourg, the parlia-
mentary act approving the treaties and allowing their ratifi cation were 
adopted by a two-thirds majority as required by Article 37(2) of the Lux-
embourg Constitution.39 The other fi ve Member States ratifi ed the found-
ing treaties by an ordinary act adopted by simple majority in parliament, 
under the constitutional provision requiring such a majority for the con-
clusion of ‘normal’ treaties. 
Denmark, the UK and Ireland
When Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the Euro-
pean Communities, the issue appeared in an entirely different light. The 
ECJ had in the meantime proclaimed the autonomy of the European legal 
order, distinguished it from ‘ordinary’ international treaties, introduced 
the concept of direct effect, and pronounced the principle of primacy on 
the grounds of the very nature of the Community. In other words, while 
doubts may still have existed in the late 1950s and early 1960s that the 
Communities were a new type of international organisation, and that 
Community law was different from classic international law, it was now 
clear ‘what these States were getting into’. Consequently, in all three 
States, there was a legal constitutional debate as to whether accession 
was constitutionally allowed under the prevailing Constitution (Ireland), 
which procedure had to be followed (Denmark), and whether the prevail-
ing rules in the country were such that the requirements of membership 
could be met in respect of the effectiveness of European law in the land 
(United Kingdom). Ireland was the only one to alter its Constitution be-
fore accession: membership was considered to infringe certain constitu-
tional provisions, in particular those on Irish sovereignty, democracy and 
the legislative function. Accordingly, a new provision was introduced in 
the Constitution, by referendum,40 allowing for Irish membership. In ad-
dition, and given the dualist traditions, an EC Act was enacted to make 
European law effective in the Irish legal order. In Denmark, the debate 
centred on the question as to whether section 20 of the Danish Consti-
tution, allowing for the ‘delegation’ of powers to international organisa-
39  Article 49bis of the Luxembourg Constitution provides that: ‘The exercise of the powers 
reserved by the Constitution to the legislature, executive, and judiciary may be temporarily 
vested by treaty in institutions governed by international law’. The procedure is prescribed in 
Article 37(2): ‘[Such treaties] are sanctioned by a law voted under the conditions laid down in 
Article 114(5)’. The latter provision on constitutional amendment requires that ‘the Chamber 
shall not proceed to the vote unless at least three-quarters of its members are present, and 
no amendment may be adopted unless it is backed by at least two-thirds of the votes’. 
40  A referendum is the constitutionally prescribed procedure for constitutional amend-
ment. 
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tions, offered suffi cient grounds to approve the Treaty. Under Section 20, 
‘Powers vested in the authorities of the Realm under this Constitution 
Act may, to such extent as shall be provided by Statute, be delegated to 
international authorities set up by mutual agreement with other States 
for the promotion of international rules of law and co-operation.’ To that 
end, the provision further prescribes a majority of fi ve-sixths of the Mem-
bers of Parliament. If that majority cannot be obtained, the Bill has to be 
submitted to the electorate in a referendum. The provision was adopted 
in 1953, with a view specifi cally to allow Denmark to participate in supra-
national organisations. Nevertheless, when Denmark did decide to join, 
there was much debate as to whether the provision could provide a suf-
fi cient basis for a transfer of the kind effected by the Accession treaty. 
A private individual sought to block the parliamentary adoption of the 
Bill, claiming that the procedure was unconstitutional: he claimed that 
accession entailed not a delegation of powers but rather a surrender of 
sovereignty, and therefore necessitated constitutional amendment under 
Section 88.41 The case was declared inadmissible, and Denmark joined 
without constitutional amendment, but after a referendum held under 
Section 20 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the question as to whether 
a constitutional amendment was in fact necessary would continue to lin-
ger, and would resurface when the Maastricht Treaty had to be ratifi ed. It 
is still debated today, in the context of the TECE and the Reform Treaty. 
Finally, the United Kingdom, of course, is a special case, given the pecu-
liarities of its own constitution. There, too, it was debated whether the 
United Kingdom could join, and whether it would be able to comply with 
all the requirements of membership. It was argued that membership was 
irreconcilable with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty: parliament 
cannot transfer powers to an international organisation since this would 
amount to restricting its own sovereignty  as well as that of any future 
parliament - and no parliament can bind itself or its successor. Likewise, 
there was debate as to whether European law could be given primacy over 
parliamentary legislation - again, this was thought to be inconceivable on 
grounds of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.42 Wade argued that 
it would be quite unreasonable to leave it to the courts to decide under 
41 Article 88 provides: ‘When the Parliament passes a Bill for the purposes of a new constitu-
tional provision, and the Government wishes to proceed with the matter, writs shall be issued 
for the election of Members of a new Parliament. If the Bill is passed unamended by the Par-
liament assembling after the election, the Bill shall within six months after its fi nal passing be 
submitted to the Electors for approval or rejection by direct voting. Rules for this voting shall 
be laid down by Statute. If a majority of the persons taking part in the voting, and at least 40 
per cent of the Electorate has voted in favour of the Bill as passed by the Parliament, and if 
the Bill receives the Royal Assent it shall form an integral part of the Constitution Act’.
42  See eg JDB Mitchell, SA Kuipers and B Gall, ‘Constitutional Aspects of the Treaty and 
Legislation relating to British membership’ (1972) CML Rev 134; HRW Wade, ‘Sovereignty 
and the European Communities’ (1972) LQR 1.
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‘some re-interpretation of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty’ or 
‘by some constitutional volte-face of their own’. Nevertheless, the adopted 
solution, the EC Act 1972, while being probably the only option in the 
absence of a formally entrenched constitutional legislation, left much un-
certainty as to whether or not the courts would give priority to parliamen-
tary statutes confl icting with European law, especially if parliament were 
to legislate contrary to European law intentionally and explicitly. In the 
end, the stumbling block appeared not to be there, for Lord Bridge in his 
famous speech in the House of Lords Factortame judgment simply stated 
that ‘If the supremacy within the European Community of Community 
law over the national law of member states was not always inherent in 
the E.E.C. Treaty, it was certainly well established in the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Justice long before the United Kingdom joined 
the Community. Thus, whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament 
accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act 1972 was en-
tirely voluntary. Under the terms of the Act of 1972 it has always been 
clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court, when delivering 
fi nal judgment, to override any rule of national law found to be in confl ict 
with any directly enforceable rule of Community law. Similarly, when 
decisions of the European Court of Justice have exposed areas of United 
Kingdom statute law which failed to implement Council directives, Parlia-
ment has always loyally accepted the obligation to make appropriate and 
prompt amendments. Thus there is nothing in anyway novel in according 
supremacy to rules of Community law in those areas to which they apply 
and to insist that, in the protection of rights under Community law, na-
tional courts must not be inhibited by rules of national law from granting 
interim relief in appropriate cases is no more than a logical recognition 
of that supremacy’.43 This did not end the debate on the exact nature of 
Community law and the relationship between parliamentary sovereignty, 
but it did now seem that parliament had succeeded in guaranteeing that 
Community law would be effective in the UK legal order, even against 
parliament. 
Greece, Portugal and Spain
The next accessions of Greece, Spain and Portugal took place on the 
basis of general transfer of powers provisions, in both cases following a 
special procedure. In Greece, the act approving accession was adopted 
with a special majority in Parliament. The Greek situation was highly 
peculiar, since the Constitution provided both for transfer of powers to 
international organisations and for limitations of sovereignty. Neverthe-
43  House of Lords, R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame Ltd (No 1) [1989] 
UKHL 1 (18 May 1989).
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less, both require different parliamentary majorities and substantive con-
ditions. A transfer of powers can, under Article 28 (2), be approved by a 
three-fi fths majority of the Members of Parliament,44 while a limitation of 
the exercise of national sovereignty requires only a majority of its mem-
bers under Article 28 (3).45 However, paragraph 3 in addition contains 
explicit substantive conditions for such limitations to be constitutional, 
relating to the national interest, fundamental rights protection and de-
mocracy. Now, did accession to the Communities amount to a transfer 
of sovereign powers or a limitation of sovereignty? When parliament sub-
mitted the Bill in parliament, it argued that in its view a simple majority 
would suffi ce, but that it would consent to the application of the stricter 
criteria, without accepting a precedent to that effect. In practical effect, 
the issue became moot, since in parliament a comfortable majority was 
obtained. It has now become the majority opinion in Greece that both 
paragraphs apply simultaneously in the contact of participation in the 
European Union, and hence that both the substantive and the strictest 
procedural requirements have to be complied with. Portugal joined with-
out a constitutional authorisation, a lacuna that was repaired only in 
1992 on the occasion of the Treaty of Maastricht. In Spain, an organic act 
was adopted, on the basis of Article 93 of the Constitution. 
b. The Single European Act
Ratifi cation of the Single European Act caused constitutional up-
heaval in Ireland. Mr Crotty, a private individual, challenged Ireland’s 
participation in the Single European Act, claiming that the Constitution, 
as it stood, could not serve as the basis for ratifi cation. The Supreme 
Court held that any amendment of the Treaties altering ‘the essential 
scope or objectives of the Communities’ would require further constitu-
tional amendment via a referendum.46 Since Crotty, every treaty amend-
ment has been ratifi ed through constitutional amendment, even if, in the 
44  ‘Authorities provided by the Constitution may by treaty or agreement be vested in agen-
cies of international organizations, when this serves an important national interest and 
promotes cooperation with other States. A majority of three-fi fths of the total number of 
Members of Parliament shall be necessary to vote the law sanctioning the treaty or agree-
ment’.
45  ‘Greece shall freely proceed by law passed by an absolute majority of the total number 
of Members of Parliament to limit the exercise of national sovereignty, insofar as this is 
dictated by an important national interest, does not infringe upon the rights of man and 
the foundations of democratic government and is effected on the basis of the principles of 
equality and under the condition of reciprocity’.
46  Irish Supreme Court, decision of 18 February and 9 April 1987, Crotty v An Taoiseach 
[1987] ILRM 400; A Oppenheimer, The Relationship between European Community Law and 
National Law: The Cases, Vol 1 (CUP, Cambridge 1994) 594. For an overview of the Irish 
constitutional position to European law until Nice, see Gerard Hogan, ‘The Nice Treaty and 
the Irish Constitution’ (2001) 7 European Public Law 565.
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case of Nice, it could have been argued that the treaty did not alter the 
‘essential scope or objectives’ of the Union. Nevertheless, also for Nice, a 
constitutional amendment was considered called for, if only because the 
treaties are mentioned in so many words in the Constitution. Gradually, 
a referendum has come to be regarded as the Irish people’s right to vote 
on European Treaties, and a referendum seems inescapable for all future 
amendments.47 
It is remarkable, though, that none of the other Member States used 
the occasion to set the constitutional record straight. Indeed, in con-
stitutional terms, a lot had changed since these states entered into the 
Communities. First, the ECJ had constitutionalised the Treaties, trans-
forming them from international treaties into the constitutional charter 
of a Community based on the rule of law,48 developing the concept of 
direct effect, and introducing an absolute and unconditional principle of 
primacy.49 Secondly, in several Member States, the constitutional courts 
had developed a position vis-à-vis European law which was not conso-
nant with the ECJ’s case law, and had developed limits to the application 
and reach of Community law in the form of core principles of the Consti-
tution (Solange and controlimiti). In short, 50 the German Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht held that as long as the EC Treaty did not have a codifi ed 
catalogue of fundamental rights, it could not claim to have unconditional 
primacy over the entire German Basic Law. The Court retained the power 
to control German implementing legislation, and indirectly EC second-
ary law itself, in the light of the fundamental principles of the German 
Constitution. The Italian Corte costituzionale claimed authority to review 
whether Community law infringed the core principles of the Italian Con-
stitution and the inalienable rights of man included therein. Accordingly, 
it was clear that the claims of the ECJ were not agreed to by the guard-
ians of the national Constitutions, and that there was a problem of con-
gruity between the national Constitutions and the European Treaties. 
Third, in some Member States, like France, the national judicial debate 
on the issue of the relationship between national and European law had 
47  See G Hogan, ‘Ratifi cation of the European Constitution - Implications for Ireland’ in A 
Albi and J Ziller (eds), The European Constitution and National Constitutions: Ratifi cation 
and Beyond (Kluwer Law International, 2007) 137.
48  Case 294/83 Parti Écologiste Les Verts v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339.
49  Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585; Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesells-
chaft [1971] ECR 1125.
50  37 BVerfGE 271 English translation [1974] 2 CMLR 540 - Internationale Handelsges-
ellschaft (Solange I). The Solange case law has been analysed in depth. For an overview of 
the development of the German case law, see Monica Claes, The National Courts Mandate 
in the European Constitution, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006) chapter 18; Norbert Reich, 
‘Judge-made “Europe à la carte”: Some Remarks on Recent Confl icts between European 
and German Constitutional Law provoked by the Banana Litigation’ (1996) 7 (1) European 
Journal of International Law.
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not been settled.51 Finally, in several Member States the shaky consti-
tutional foundations of the state’s participation in European integration 
had been objected to before the courts. The Italian, German and Danish 
courts had been confronted with the challenges, which they all rejected, 
but the discomfort of these courts was obvious in their judgments. And 
yet none of these Member States adjusted the constitutional scheme fol-
lowed for the initial treaties. 
c. The turning point: Maastricht
The Treaty of Maastricht would prove to be a turning point. Several 
Member States, among which most conspicuously Germany and France, 
amended their Constitutions and introduced Europe provisions. Spain 
and Portugal proceeded to constitutional amendment before ratifi cation, 
in order to amend provisions in the Constitution which confl icted with 
the obligations contained in the Treaty. Several constitutional courts also 
became involved before or during the ratifi cation procedure, in particu-
lar the French Conseil constitutionnel, the German Bundesverfassungs-
gericht and the Spanish Tribunal constitucional. In Germany, Article 23 
was inserted, preceding the general provision of Article 24 which was no 
longer considered suffi cient, and since that place in the Constitution had 
become vacant upon German reunifi cation. The new Article 23 is a spe-
cial Europe provision, dealing specifi cally with European integration. It 
confi rms to some extent the Solange case law by introducing substantive 
conditions to German participation in the EU, and indicating the limits 
thereof, by reference to the Ewigkeitsklausel of Article 79 of the Basic 
Law. In addition, the provision now prescribes a special majority in the 
Bundestag and Bundesrat for all Treaty amendments encompassing an 
amendment or supplement to the Basic Law. Finally, the provision deals 
with the domestic implications of membership, and participation in and 
division of responsibilities between the German parliament and govern-
ment, and between the Bund and the Länder.52 France also introduced a 
Europe provision in Articles 88-1 through 88-4 of the Constitution.53 The 
51  While the Cour de cassation had accepted the primacy case law of the ECJ, the Conseil 
d’état rejected it, and did not accept jurisdiction to review national legislation in the light of 
Community law. It held that it had no jurisdiction to do so under the French constitution. 
52  In addition, Article 45 of the Basic Law was introduced, stating that ‘The Bundestag shall 
appoint a Committee on European Union Affairs. It may authorize the committee to exercise 
the rights of the Bundestag under Article 23 vis-à-vis the Federal Government’.
53  Art 88-1: ‘The Republic shall participate in the European Communities and in the Euro-
pean Union constituted by States that have freely chosen, by virtue of the treaties that es-
tablished them, to exercise some of their powers in common’; Art 88-2: ‘Subject to reciproc-
ity and in accordance with the terms of the Treaty on European Union signed on 7 February 
1992, France agrees to the transfer of powers necessary for the establishment of European 
economic and monetary union and for the determination of rules relating to the crossing of 
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Conseil constitutionnel had found that several provisions of the Treaty of 
Maastricht confl icted with specifi c provisions of the French Constitution 
and/or ‘the essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty’. 
But instead of amending each provision separately, the French consti-
tutional legislature took recourse to a Europe provision, and placed it 
in a separate Title, immediately after the provision on association agree-
ments.54  Spain adopted a different approach and amended the Constitu-
tion only with respect to the provisions which the Tribunal constitucional 
had declared to confl ict with the Treaty, ie those on the right to stand 
as a candidate in municipal elections. It was a very limited amendment, 
and did not mention the EU specifi cally. The Portuguese amendment was 
more extensive, and aimed to constitutionalise Portuguese membership, 
as well as remove some inconsistencies and increase the powers of the 
Portuguese parliament in the context of EU decision-making. Finally, the 
Irish Constitution was amended in the usual manner, through referen-
dum, and by introducing a reference to the Treaty and providing for con-
stitutional immunity for EU law adopted under the new Treaty.
Nevertheless, other Member States, Belgium, the Netherlands, Lux-
embourg, Italy and Denmark, approved and ratifi ed the Treaty of Maas-
tricht on the basis of the old constitutional provisions, and, with the 
exception of Denmark, on the basis of an Act of Parliament passed by a 
simple majority. In Denmark, the Treaty was adopted after a referendum 
on the basis of the transfer of powers provision in Section 20 of the Con-
stitution. Yet, the Act authorising ratifi cation was later challenged before 
the courts, on the grounds that Section 20 could not support the Treaty. 
The Højesteret rejected the claim fi nally in 1996, several years after the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, while conceding that consti-
tutional issues may arise. Also, the Court looked at the Treaty and Euro-
pean law as interpreted by the ECJ before the Treaty of Maastricht very 
carefully in the light of the Danish Constitution. They passed the Danish 
constitutional test, but only under certain conditions and with caveats 
attached: the Danish courts would have to check whether fundamental 
the external borders of the Member States of the European Community’; Art 88-3: ‘Subject 
to reciprocity and in accordance with the terms of the Treaty on European Union signed on 
7 February 1992, the right to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal elections shall be 
granted only to citizens of the Union residing in France. Such citizens shall neither exercise 
the offi ce of mayor or deputy mayor nor participate in the designation of Senate electors or 
in the election of senators. An institutional Act passed in identical terms by the two assem-
blies shall determine the manner of implementation of this article’; Art 88-4: ‘The Govern-
ment shall lay before the National Assembly and the Senate any proposals for Community 
instruments which contain provisions which are matters for statute as soon as they have 
been transmitted to the Council of the Communities. Whether Parliament is in session or 
not, resolutions may be passed under this article in the manner laid down by the rules of 
procedure of each assembly’.
54  Article 88 reads: ‘The Republic may conclude agreements with States that wish to as-
sociate themselves with it in order to develop their civilizations’.
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rights were protected, and that the European institutions would keep 
within the limits of their powers. The Højesteret thus put its name on 
the list of national courts taking up the battle on fi nal authority with the 
ECJ. In the Netherlands, there was some debate as to whether the pro-
cedure of Article 91(3) had to be followed to ratify this Treaty. That provi-
sion requires a two-thirds majority in parliament for the ratifi cation of 
unconstitutional treaties. Nevertheless, the government, parliament and 
the majority of academia maintained that the situation of Article 91 did 
not arise, and the Treaty was approved on the basis of the usual ordinary 
statute adopted with a simple majority. In Italy, too, there was some de-
bate, but the Treaty was approved on the basis of the old Article 11 with 
an ordinary Act of Parliament. In Belgium, the Council of State, advising 
on the Act of approval submitted to it, warned that the provisions on vot-
ing rights for EU citizens would confl ict with the Belgian Constitution, 
and urged for constitutional amendment. Yet, the Prime Minister stated 
that in any case, should there be a confl ict between the Constitution and 
the Treaty, the latter would prevail, and that hence there was no urgency 
to proceed to constitutional revision! The constitutional amendment was 
effected only well after ratifi cation in 1998. This left the constitutional 
court in a very awkward position, when, after ratifi cation, the constitu-
tionality of the Act of approval was challenged on precisely these grounds. 
Confl ict was manifest and had been pointed out, but a declaration of un-
constitutionality could hardly be said to make any sense since it would 
not carry effects on the international fi eld and Belgium would continue to 
be bound by the Treaty. Moreover, the court, given the vast support for 
the Treaty, would have a hard time having the decision enforced. It chose 
to hold the claim inadmissible. 
Why, then, did the Maastricht Treaty constitute the turning point, 
when the Single European Act did not? First, the Maastricht Treaty con-
stituted a quantum leap in European integration, and it was perceived 
to do so. This was preceded by a steep rise in legislative activity by the 
Community institutions under the Single European Act, and, conse-
quently, by an increased awareness of the political institutions within 
the Member States, especially parliaments, of the impact of European 
law on the domestic scene. Secondly, there may have been an overspill 
from one country to another, and from one court to another. In Germany, 
which was fi rst to amend its Basic Law, the amendment was instigated 
at the request of the Länder who feared erosion of their powers through 
further transfer to Europe. In France, the revision was required by the 
Conseil constitutionnel, which it would also request for the Treaty of Am-
sterdam.55 In Germany, however, neither Amsterdam nor Nice prompted 
55  Nice was not put before the Conseil, while the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe was.
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constitutional amendment. Likewise, in the other old Member States, as 
always, with the exception of Ireland, Amsterdam and Nice would cause 
no constitutional upheaval. 
Sweden, Finland and Austria 
For the new Member States joining after the entry into force of Maas-
tricht, the constitutional legal issue became much more prominent, and 
constitutional amendment was considered necessary. When Sweden, 
Finland and Austria joined, the acquis had again changed dramatically. 
They were the fi rst to join the EU rather than the EC, with the prospect 
of the next Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) coming up only one year 
into membership, concerning issues which could have repercussions on 
the national Constitution, including fundamental rights, citizenship, in-
stitutional reform, etc. In all three countries, the general transfer of pow-
ers provisions were considered too slim to support the massive transfer 
implicated in membership. In Austria, membership was considered to 
bring about a fundamental change to fundamental constitutional prin-
ciples, especially democracy, separation of powers and the rule of law. 
Consequently, Austria proceeded to a Gesamtänderung of the Constitu-
tion. A new chapter was introduced in the fi rst part of the Constitution, 
entitled ‘On the European Union’, re-arranging the division of powers 
and competences among Austrian authorities in the context of EU mem-
bership. In addition, a special Constitutional Act was adopted to facili-
tate accession. Since then, all Treaty amendments have been considered 
to require such a Constitutional Act. In all, Austria probably possesses 
the most extensive constitutional Europe provisions in the entire EU. In 
Sweden, a specifi c Europe provision was added to the general transfer 
of powers provision. The provision allows for a transfer of powers to the 
EC (sic), under the condition of equal protection of fundamental rights, 
and requiring a three-fourths majority of those present and voting in the 
Riksdag. In 2002, the constitutional provision was amended, and it now 
states the EU as the benefi ciary of the transfer. An additional limitation 
is that any transfer should not relate to competences ‘affecting the princi-
ples of the form of government’. The Finnish Constitution did not contain 
a transfer of powers provision, but accession was achieved by way of an 
exceptive enactment. Such an enactment is considered to ‘make a hole 
in the Constitution’, and to allow for indirect derogation from the Consti-
tution, without full-fl edged constitutional amendment, on the condition 
that such laws are approved by a two-thirds majority in parliament (Sec-
tion 95 (2) of the Constitution). Finland adopted a new Constitution in 
2000, but it did not adapt its constitutional stance on the EU, and mem-
bership continues to be based on the same exceptive enactment. 
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d. The Constitutional Treaty
In the Member States under review, constitutional amendment was 
considered warranted only in France, again upon a decision of the Con-
seil constitutionnel, and in Portugal.  In all other Member States that had 
ratifi ed the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TECE), the 
prevailing constitutional provisions were considered suffi cient to support 
ratifi cation, and the TECE was considered not to warrant further consti-
tutional adjustment. In Spain and France, the question of the constitu-
tionality of the Constitutional Treaty was put before the constitutional 
courts.56 The French Conseil constitutionnel entered into some of the most 
fundamental constitutional questions on the nature of the Constitutional 
Treaty, the relationship between the Constitutional Treaty and the French 
Constitution, and the position of France in the EU. The Conseil stressed 
that the French Constitution recognises France’s participation in the EU 
in Article 88-1 of the Constitution. It also pointed out that the Constitu-
tional Treaty remains essentially just that, a Treaty, and does not as such 
endanger the French Constitution. It stated that the primacy clause of 
Article I-6 did not alter the prevailing status quo as expressed in its case 
law. Finally, it held that there were no contradictions between the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the French Constitution, albeit upon 
certain ‘clarifi cations’ adduced by the Conseil itself. Then, once all poten-
tial hurdles of a fundamental nature had been cleared, the Conseil ana-
lysed the substantive provisions of the Constitutional Treaty and pointed 
out which amendments were called for. These related to: the provisions 
pertaining to ‘matters of Statehood’ (in the Area and CFSP), the new pow-
ers conferred upon national parliaments to oppose a ‘simplifi ed revision’ 
of the Treaty (Art IV-444) or to ensure compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity. The constitutional amendment took place through an as-
sembly of the Assemblée and Sénat in the Congrès, with the intention of 
changing the Constitution in two steps. One set of amendments (a ref-
erence to the Constitutional Treaty in Article 88-1 and the introduction 
of a referendum for any future accessions after Bulgaria, Romania and 
Croatia in Article 88-5) entered into force immediately. The other amend-
ments - in Articles 88-4 through 88-6 - relating mostly to the powers of 
the French parliament, were to become effective upon the entry into force 
of the Constitutional Treaty. 
56  See M Claes, ‘The European Constitution and the Role of National Constitutional Courts’ 
in A Albi and J Ziller, The European Constitution and National Constitutions: Ratifi cation and 
Beyond (Kluwer Law International, 2007) 235; Loïc Azoulai and Felix Ronkes Agerbeek, 
‘Conseil constitutionnel (French Constitutional Court) Decision No 2004-505 DC of 19 No-
vember 2004, on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’ (2005) 42 CML Rev 
871-886; C Schutte, ‘Tribunal Constitucional on the European Constitution. Declaration of 
13 December 2004’ (2005) 1 EuConst 281.
26 Monica Claes: The Europeanisation of National Constitutions in the Constitutionalisation...
In Spain, the Government asked the Tribunal constitucional to pro-
nounce itself on the question (1) whether the primacy provision in the 
TECE was compatible with the Spanish Constitution; (2) whether there 
was a contradiction between the Spanish Constitution and Article II-111 
and II-112 of the EU Charter; (3)whether Article 93 of the Spanish Con-
stitution, which had served as the basis for Spanish membership thus 
far, was still suffi cient to ratify the TECE and (4) if required, which pro-
cedure should be followed for constitutional amendment to comply with 
the TECE. The Constitutional Court did not fi nd any unconstitutionality 
in the primacy provision, or in Articles II-111 and II-112. Article 93 was 
suffi cient to be used as the constitutional basis and, hence, there was 
no need for constitutional amendment.  After the positive outcome of 
the referendum, which was, by the way, not constitutionally mandatory 
or binding, ratifi cation was approved by way of an organic act57 on the 
basis of the long-standing Article 93 of the Constitution. In Portugal, the 
Constitution was amended at an early stage, in April 2004, to include a 
provision stating that ‘Subject to reciprocity and to respect for the funda-
mental principles of a democratic state based on the rule of law and for 
the principle of subsidiarity, and with a view to the achievement of the 
economic, social and territorial cohesion of an area of freedom, security 
and justice and the defi nition and implementation of a common external, 
security and defence policy, Portugal may enter into agreements for the 
exercise jointly, in cooperation or by the Union’s institutions, of the pow-
ers needed to construct and deepen the European Union’. In addition, 
Article 8 (4) was introduced with a view to ratifying the Constitution-
al Treaty.58 It had been argued that without such a provision, Portugal 
could not ratify the Constitutional Treaty containing Article I-6 TECE. 
That provision was considered to be at odds with the prevailing under-
standing of the Constitution. In order to remove all doubts, the constitu-
tional amendments were included. 
Again, in those other ‘old’ Member States which had ratifi ed the 
TECE, constitutional amendments were not made. Belgium, Italy, and 
Luxembourg ratifi ed the Constitutional Treaty on the basis of the old 
transfer of powers provisions, without any constitutional amendment. 
Belgium and Italy did so by recourse to an Act of Parliament passed by a 
simple majority, the procedure required for the conclusion of internation-
al treaties. In Germany, a two-thirds majority was required and obtained 
57  An organic act must be passed by both Houses, and adopted with an absolute majority 
in the House of Representatives.
58  ‘The provisions of the treaties that govern the European Union and the rules issued by 
its institutions in the exercise of their respective responsibilities shall apply in Portuguese 
internal law in accordance with Union law and with respect for the fundamental principles 
of a democratic state based on the rule of law’.
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in both the Bundestag and Bundesrat,59 while Luxembourg organised a 
referendum before adopting the Act, which required, in accordance with 
the Luxembourg Constitution, two readings and a special two-thirds ma-
jority in Parliament. Finland ratifi ed the TECE very late, in December 
2006, without recourse to a referendum. It was agreed, however, that 
since the TECE contains provisions which are at odds with the Finnish 
Constitution, both the Act of approval and the incorporation enactment 
adopted by the Finnish Parliament should require a two-thirds majority. 
In short, the TECE, which was considered to constitute a ‘refonde-
ment constitutionnel’ of the EU, the formal constitutional charter of the 
refurbished European Union, was not considered to call for national con-
stitutional adjustment. There are a number of reasons for this. In sev-
eral Member States, such as Italy, constitutional reform was considered 
overly complex, and would have caused delays in the ratifi cation process, 
which were considered unwarranted. In other Member States, the politi-
cal situation argued against constitutional reform. Indeed, often a large 
majority in parliament, two readings or even referendums are required to 
amend the Constitution, and these conditions would have made ratifi ca-
tion much more cumbersome, or would even have prevented it. Yet, there 
were other, more legal(istic) arguments: the TECE was thought of as a 
Treaty after all, at least in legal terms, and hence, it could be ratifi ed as 
any other international treaty. Or, potential confl icts between the national 
Constitution and the TECE were brushed away or simply postponed until 
after its entry into force.60 Because the TECE was not a Constitution, it 
did not threaten the supremacy of the national Constitution, and hence 
it could be ratifi ed under the old and general transfer of powers provision 
and without constitutional reform. This is all the more remarkable be-
cause, in the societal debate, the very fact that the document claimed to 
be a constitution was one of the main arguments against it, precisely as it 
would threaten the national Constitution and the State’s sovereignty.61
This should not be taken to imply that the TECE would not have left 
traces in national constitutional law. Indeed, while the text of the Con-
stitution may, in most of the old Member States not have been amended, 
the TECE has directly or indirectly triggered constitutional change. For 
instance, in several countries, the TECE contributed to increased aware-
59  In the end, the German president suspended ratifi cation, until the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht decided on a constitutional complaint brought against the Act of approval. 
60  So, for instance, the thorny issue under Belgian constitutional law and in Belgian poli-
tics of how to divide the two votes attributed to each national parliament in the early warn-
ing mechanism, among three or sometimes fi ve competent parliaments… See on this, for 
instance, W Pas, ‘The Belgian “National Parliament” from the Perspective of the EU Consti-
tutional Treaty’ in Ph Kiiver (ed), National and Regional Parliaments in the European Consti-
tutional Order (Europe Law Publishing, Groningen 2006) 57.
61  This, in any case, was a commonly heard argument in the Netherlands. 
28 Monica Claes: The Europeanisation of National Constitutions in the Constitutionalisation...
ness of the responsibilities of national parliaments in the EU legislative 
process and modernisation of the rules and conventions on working rela-
tions between parliament and government in European affairs.62 In some 
Member States, the internal procedures for setting up their early warning 
system have already been put in place, and the mechanisms have started 
to operate, including in the Netherlands.63 Yet, the constitutional texts 
are seldom updated for new developments. This is not in and of itself 
a bad thing: Constitutions never represent the full picture but must be 
seen in context and read in the light of implementing legislation, case 
law, conventions and political practice. Hardly ever do the constitutional 
texts fully correspond to reality. Nevertheless, there are limits - depend-
ing on the type of constitution and the national constitutional traditions 
- as to how far these texts can be incomplete and can deviate from con-
stitutional reality. 
Also, the absence of Europe in the national Constitution, and the 
failure to recognise the constitutional nature of the EU and express it in 
the national Constitution may have adverse effects. This, of course, is very 
diffi cult to measure. Yet, it can be argued that the lack of a constitutional 
tradition in the Netherlands of itself made many people wary and suspi-
cious of a European Constitution. If the EU was to have a Constitution, 
this could only mean that it wanted to be a State, which would transform 
the Netherlands into a province of the European Super State. Admittedly, 
it is impossible to tell whether the outcome of the referendum would have 
been different if the Constitution of the Netherlands had been adapted 
to the reality of membership, and it is highly likely that there is no direct 
positive link. After all, the French Constitution contains Europe provi-
sions. Nevertheless, the fact that Europe is missing from the text of the 
Constitution adds to more serious defects: European affairs are largely 
absent from national politics, are not or are hardly reported in the media, 
and, until recently, European affairs and European law have remained 
absent from national constitutional practice and European law. This is 
so despite, or possibly precisely because of, the fact that the Netherlands 
Constitution and Netherlands law has been very open and receptive to 
European law, and this it true also for the State as a member of the EU 
and for the Dutch population.64 As a consequence, the Dutch attitude to-
wards the EU on one hand, and Dutch constitutional law towards EU law 
on the other, have until recently not been very sophisticated. Because of 
62  For Germany, see D Thym, ‘Parliamentary Control of EU Decision-making in Germany. 
Supportive Federal Scrutiny and Restrictive Regional Action’ in O Tans, C Zoethout and J 
Peters (eds), National Parliaments and European Democracy. A Bottom-up Approach to Euro-
pean Constitutionalism (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 2007) 49.
63  A regularly updated overview can be found at <www.cosac.eu>. 
64  See Claes and De Witte (n 37) 177.
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the principles of the primacy of international treaties and of EU law, com-
bined with a sober approach towards the Dutch Constitution itself, the 
relationship between the Dutch Constitution and Dutch law and politics 
on one side, and the EU and European law on the other, has remained 
uncontested. Both were considered separate legal orders, and as a con-
sequence Europe was considered rather matter-of-factly as extraneous to 
Dutch politics and to the Dutch constitutional and legal order. This may 
well have ricocheted now. It is a fact, for instance, that the new provi-
sion of Article I-6 of the TECE caused great upheaval in the Netherlands, 
even though there was nothing new about it, and, more importantly, the 
Dutch Constitution contains a provision awarding primacy to all inter-
national treaties. There was a debate among academics whether Article 
I-6 constituted a novelty, and whether it had any consequences for the 
Dutch Constitution. In the brochure distributed to all Dutch households 
before the referendum, it was presented as a novelty, and in the debate 
running up to the referendum, the principle was picked up as a threat to 
the sovereignty of the Netherlands.
It is submitted that the better option, both from a practical and a 
theoretical perspective, is to mention the EU in the Constitution. To omit 
the EU from the Constitution can even be considered a devaluation of the 
State’s own Constitution, and an expression of carelessness in the sup-
posed fundamental norm constituting and regulating the polity.
4. Types of provisions
There is, thus, no common constitutional approach to Europe among 
the old Member States of the EU. And obviously, as long as the require-
ments of membership are complied with, as set out in the treaties and 
explained in the case law of the ECJ, Member States have great leeway 
in how to approach the EU from a national constitutional perspective. 
Despite the fact that there are great differences in the approach to the 
EU, from no mention at all in the constitutional texts (the Netherlands 
and Spain), to fairly detailed Europe provisions (Austria, Portugal), some 
trends are discernable. Looking at the practice of the EU-15, it is possible 
to categorise constitutional provisions relating to EU membership in two 
types of provisions. Given that most of these provisions concern the rela-
tionship between two separate, albeit intertwined, legal orders, there are 
two directions in the provisions on the EU, and it is possible to speak of 
‘aller’ provisions and ‘retour’ provisions. The fi rst set of provisions (‘aller’) 
concern the transfer of powers and the passing on of power and responsi-
bilities, which, from the national perspective, are to represent the State in 
the EU. The second set (‘retour’) relates to the national response to what 
comes out of the EU. A third set of provisions, which is still rather rare, 
concerns the changed relationship and balance between the national in-
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stitutions and organs themselves (during the decision-making process at 
the EU level and during implementation), as a consequence of member-
ship, as well as, where relevant, between the central (federal) State and 
the federated entities. Since these arrangements ultimately all relate to 
the consequences of membership, I have also categorised them under the 
heading ‘retour’.   
a. Aller-provisions
Transfer of powers or limitation of sovereignty 
Of the fourteen Constitutions under review,65 all contain transfer of 
powers provisions. Out of these, seven (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Greece, Denmark and Greece)66 still base their membership of 
the Union on ‘old fashioned’ and general transfer of powers provisions, 
without specifying the EU. The other Member States have either adapted 
these provisions for the benefi t of the EU, such as Portugal or Sweden, or 
have special Europe provisions in a separate chapter (Germany, France), 
and in the case of Austria  they are complemented with a separate con-
stitutional law. Finland has a unique approach, in that the Constitution 
itself organises a ‘hole’, a vacuum in the constitution, which even allows 
for derogations from the Constitution.
Now, why is it considered vital that the Constitution specifi cally al-
lows for a transfer? The reason is that without such permission, member-
ship is considered to be unconstitutional, for breach of the principle of 
sovereignty in all or several of its various appearances: State sovereignty, 
national sovereignty, and popular sovereignty. It is now clear that mem-
bership of the EU entails important changes in the workings of the most 
fundamental principles of the Constitution and its arrangements: sepa-
ration of powers, democracy, rule of law, and protection of fundamental 
rights. Accordingly, accession in fact brings about a dramatic shift in the 
constitutional arrangements. Hence, it requires constitutional change, or 
at least a specifi c constitutional authorisation to enter into international 
treaties causing these internal changes. Consequently, many national 
Constitutions distinguish between ‘simple’ transfers of powers which do 
not entail constitutional amendment, and those which do, and which of-
ten require that stricter procedures are complied with, mostly similar to 
those that apply to constitutional amendment.
65  Because of the absence of a written constitutional document, the UK is not included 
here.
66  A declaration has been added to the Greek Constitution, stating that the general provi-
sion in Article 28 serves as the basis for Greek membership of the EU.
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The procedure for additional transfers
Most Constitutions now require a special majority in parliament, or 
a referendum, for the approval of additional transfers of power to the EU. 
This is not so, however, in all of the Member States under review. In the 
Netherlands, Spain, Italy and Belgium, new transfers require a simple 
Act of Parliament, although in Belgium no less than seven parliamentary 
chambers must give their consent. The Spanish and Dutch referendums 
were not constitutionally required. Nevertheless, politically it may now 
have become diffi cult to avoid new referendums. Accordingly, one of the 
main objectives of the Netherlands government for the Reform Treaty was 
to remove all constitutional elements, and to present it as a simple revi-
sion, involving a few additional powers for the EU. Consequently, a new 
referendum would not be required. In its coalition agreement, the new 
government which came to power in February 2007 agreed to ask the 
Council of State for advice on whether a new referendum on the Reform 
Treaty was called for. 
The Irish Constitution is the only one which requires a referendum 
for every new Treaty amendment, since every ratifi cation requires a con-
stitutional amendment. Most Constitutions require a special majority in 
parliament. Some distinguish between transfers encompassing constitu-
tional amendment and those which do not.67 In other Member States, the 
Constitution is not conclusive about transfers which affect the Constitu-
tion. The question then arises about whether such transfer of powers 
is constitutionally allowed for, which may in itself and constitutionally 
generate constitutional amendments (Belgium), or whether such transfer 
requires specifi c and explicit prior constitutional amendment (Portugal). 
When this is not provided for, it will often be for the courts to decide 
whether and how far European law, deriving from the Treaties agreed to 
in accordance with their constitutional requirements, can deviate from 
the national constitutional provisions. The question mostly arises after 
the entry into force of such law, and is mostly phrased in terms of pri-
macy. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
Substantive conditions for membership
More and more Constitutions contain substantive conditions on 
membership, for instance the German,68 Swedish,69 Greek,70 and Portu-
67  For instance, the Constitutions of Austria, Sweden (Articles 10 (2) and 10 (5) of the In-
strument of Government).
68  Article 23 (1) of the Basic law.
69  Article 5 of Chapter 10 of the Instrument of Government.
70  Article 28 (3) of the Greek Constitution
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guese71 Constitutions. These are often referred to as ‘structural safeguard 
clauses’, and were fi rst developed in the case law of several constitutional 
courts, most famously in the case law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
(Solange). They also go under the notion of counterlimits (‘controlimiti’). In 
other Member States, these conditions are not made explicit in the Con-
stitution, but they may be presumed. The French Conseil constitution-
nel, for instance, reviews whether international treaties, including those 
by which powers are transferred to the EU, comply with the ‘conditions 
essentielles de la souvereinté nationale’. These constitutional conditions 
mostly relate to respect for fundamental rights, and to basic constitu-
tional requirements, most specifi cally the rule of law and democracy. 
What, then, is the effect of such provisions? They cannot, from the 
perspective of European law, be invoked against EU law or to escape in-
ternational liability for failure to comply with treaty obligations. First and 
foremost, they serve as instructions for those responsible at the nation-
al level for the negotiation, conclusion and ratifi cation of the founding, 
accession and amendment treaties, ie the government, parliament, and 
possibly also the people in a referendum. They are not allowed to con-
clude and ratify treaties which would infringe these conditions, or affect 
the principles mentioned. In this sense, these conditions also contain the 
outer limits of membership. Secondly, the same instructions are directed 
to those organs of the State which participate in decision-making at the 
European level, once the Treaty has entered into force. The national rep-
resentative in the European Council or the Council, or the delegate in a 
comity, remains bound by the instructions of the proper Constitution. 
Under this ‘constitutional two hat theory’, national representatives do not 
remove their constitutional hat when entering the European negotiating 
room. Even when acting as European agents, they remain bound by the 
national Constitution. Thirdly, these conditions will be used as standards 
for review by the national (constitutional) courts. Obviously, recourse to 
these constitutional conditions by a national court as against European 
law would not be in accordance with the orthodoxies of European law and 
the primacy thereof. Yet, the presence of these safeguards in the national 
Constitution may well be the price to pay for the participation of the State 
in European integration, and for the loyal acceptance of European law in 
the bulk of cases. Finally, and while constitutional provisions obviously 
do not apply outside the national boundaries, these conditions serve to 
constitutionalise the Treaties, as a caution to the European institutions 
in general and to the ECJ in particular. In a composite constitution, as 
has been described above, national constitutional principles have also to 
be taken into account at EU level. This is especially true for the principles 
which are common to the Member States. 
71  Article 7 (6) of the Portuguese Constitution.
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Organising the State’s participation in the EU institutions
Transferring powers to the EU does not simply mean abandoning 
those powers. Indeed, the Member States participate in the institutional 
structure of the EU. The manner in which the State is represented in the 
European institutions infl uences both the EU decision-making process, 
and the national constitutional arrangements and balance of powers. In 
some Member States, but not many, constitutional provisions deal with 
the manner in which the State is represented at the EU level, and/or in 
which way the state participates in decision making at the EU level. The 
Portuguese and Austrian Constitutions are most elaborate in this respect. 
In most Member States, however, these issues are either not considered 
to require constitutional regulation. Finally, in federal states, provision 
is made, either in the Constitution or in arrangements having an equal 
standing, such as organic laws, for the representation of the federated 
entities at EU level, or the manner in which the State represents the fed-
erated entities at the EU level. There are several manners in which this 
can be achieved. 
b. ‘Retour’ provisions
The Incoming Tide: The effect of EU law in the domestic legal order
The question of how European law takes effect in the domestic legal 
order and which rank it takes in the domestic hierarchy of norms, or 
how it relates to other norms applicable in the land, is an issue which 
is mostly not explicitly dealt with in the Constitution. In many Member 
States, these issues are resolved by recourse to constitutional provisions, 
but very often these provisions were not adopted with a view to coping 
with the issue of EU law specifi cally. Indeed, the question of the effect of 
European law and its place in the domestic legal order arose during the 
fi rst phase of European constitutional integration. None of the founding 
Member States had made provision for these questions for the EC spe-
cifi cally, and, what is more, the issue was left open during the negotia-
tions of the Treaties.72 Accordingly, when the ECJ held that, as a matter 
of Community law, the direct effect of certain provisions of Community 
law and their primacy derive from the nature of Community law itself, 
most national courts responded by translating ECJ case law into the 
language of their own constitutional system. Hence, the French courts 
had recourse to a new interpretation of Article 55 of the Constitution to 
found the French version of direct effect and primacy. In Germany (Ar-
ticle 24) and Italy (Article 11), direct effect and primacy of Community 
72  See the Memoirs of Pierre Pescatore, ‘De werkzaamheden van de “Juridische Groep” bij 
de onderhandelingen over de Verdragen van Rome’ (1981) Studia Diplomatica 167.
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law over ordinary legislation was based on the constitutional transfer of 
powers provisions.73 Basing direct effect and primacy on a constitutional 
provision is not in itself contrary to European law. Nevertheless, these 
provisions are also used to grant the courts the power to introduce limits 
to the applicability of European law in the domestic legal order. Indeed, 
these provisions must be read in the context of the entire Constitution, 
which limits them. As a consequence, European law is only applicable 
insofar as it does not infringe the fundamental provisions of the national 
Constitution.
In the absence of constitutional primacy and transfer of powers pro-
visions, the Belgian Cour de cassation followed the lead of the ECJ (and 
the Luxembourg Cour de cassation), and founded primacy and direct ef-
fect on the very nature of international treaties, which applied a fortiori 
to Community law.74 
Also, the relationship between the Constitution itself and European 
law is a matter which, ultimately, is often left for decision by the courts. 
Exceptions are the Dutch, Irish and - via a renvoi to European law - the 
Portuguese Constitution, which do provide for the constitutional immu-
nity of European law. In other words, the Constitution itself provides that 
in the event of confl ict, the Constitution gives way to EU law. The Irish 
Constitution is one of the few Constitutions of the EU-15 to expressly 
provide for the direct effect and primacy of European law - applying even 
to third pillar law - even over the Constitution. This was considered nec-
essary in the Irish context, since the Constitution specifi cally declares 
Irish dualism on the relationship between international treaties and Irish 
law. 
The national division of powers in EU matters 
Membership of the EU and participation in EU decision-making has 
important consequences for the national separation of powers. Indeed, 
international relations and foreign policy are, in most Member States, 
the province of the government. The transfer of powers to the EU has the 
direct effect that matters which used to belong to the province of the leg-
islature, through transfer to the EU, shift from the legislature to the gov-
ernment. National parliaments were traditionally called losers, or at least 
latecomers, in European integration,75 losing out to their governments 
73  It may seem bold to derive primacy from a provision allowing for the transfer of powers 
to an international organisation. For an explanation of the arguments, see M Claes, The 
National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006) 620.
74  See the famous judgment in Franco-suisse le Ski, decision of 27 May 1971 [1972] CMLR 
330.
75  A Maurer and W Wessels (eds), National Parliaments on Their Ways to Europe: Losers or 
Latecomers? (Nomos, Baden Baden 2001).
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and contributing to widening the democratic gap in European decision-
making by failing to hold their national governments to account in fi elds 
where they used to adopt legislation. Instead, in many fi elds, they have 
let themselves be transformed into secondary legislatures, implementing 
European legislation, within the limits set by the European institutions 
(including their own governments). Democratic input in EU decision-
making was supposed to run via the European Parliament. In addition, 
accountability should be  channelled through the national governments, 
being held to account by their own parliaments. Thus, while the Council 
is accountable to no single body at the European level, the national rep-
resentatives in the Council are accountable to their parliaments individu-
ally. This latter form of democratic input and control has increased over 
the past decade. While the powers of the European Parliament have grad-
ually increased, its role is perceived as insuffi cient to supply democratic 
legitimacy to EU law, and national parliaments are now regarded crucial 
in redressing the democratic defi cit, and guaranteeing accountability. In 
most Member States, parliamentary involvement in EU decision-making 
runs via scrutiny of the government under the rules and mechanisms of 
ministerial responsibility (which usually applies ex post), complemented, 
more and more, with ex ante mechanisms. The latter mechanisms are 
used by national parliaments to infl uence the government’s position in 
negotiations at the EU level, through mandate, strict scrutiny or other 
types of infl uence. Obviously, scrutiny by national parliaments presumes 
that they are informed of what goes on at the EU level. In some Member 
States, the rules and mechanisms governing parliament’s role in EU deci-
sion-making are those applying to national decision-making, without any 
constitutional or legislative change. Since the Treaty of Maastricht, how-
ever, several Member States have changed the constitutional provisions 
relating to the parliament’s role, often in the Europe provision or chapter 
in the Constitution, and worked out in legislative provisions. Examples 
are Article 23 (1) and (2) of the German Basic Law,76 Articles 88-4 of the 
French Constitution, Article 23e of the Austria Constitution, or Articles 
161(n), 163(f) and 197(i) of the Portuguese Constitution. The involvement 
of national parliaments in EU matters usually runs along the very same 
rules and practices as those applying to national politics and law making. 
Research has pointed out that in many Member States, parliament’s in-
volvement is often defective, because, despite the fl ow of paperwork and 
documents, there is a lack of information and oversight. Added to this, 
EU decision-making hardly ever leads national parliaments to hold a min-
ister fully accountable for their contribution to EU decision-making, and 
76  This is further elaborated in the Act on Cooperation between the Federal Government 
and the Bundestag in Matters Concerning the European Union, and the new Agreement on 
Cooperation in the Field of EU Affairs.
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there is still a widespread disinterest of national MPs in European affairs. 
This is still considered to be overly complex, deriving from an external 
source, ‘Brussels’, which is considered to represent non transparent and 
unaccountable bureaucracy. In the end, the traditional mechanisms of 
parliamentary scrutiny built on ministerial responsibility often prove to 
be unconvincing mechanisms of parliamentary control, even more than 
for national policy and law making.
Since the Treaty of Maastricht, and especially with the Protocol on 
national parliaments annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, the role of 
national parliaments in European decision-making has been taken from 
the exclusive realm of national constitutional law, and a European con-
stitutional dimension has been added to it. The role of national parlia-
ments is no longer strictly a matter of national constitutional law alone, 
but an attempt is made to steer, organise and increase their involvement 
at the European level.77 Still, the adaptation of the national parliament’s 
role and the constitutional rules governing it, is slow. It does take place, 
however, even if this is not always refl ected in the constitutional texts. 
This is a hugely important evolution, and it is a search for constitutional 
best practice and best constitutional design. Indeed, the participation of 
national parliaments serves to increase constitutionalism and democ-
racy at the EU level as well as at the national level, both of which do not 
necessarily coincide. At the same time, decision-making at the EU level 
should not be obstructed. The process of democratisation and constitu-
tionalisation in the EU is a process of designing a constitutional frame-
work, taking place at both the EU level, the national level, as well as the 
trans-national level. The search is for improved mechanisms to achieve 
democracy and accountability in the EU as a polity beyond the State, 
and these mechanisms will not be found at one level only, European or 
national. The developments in the role of national parliaments and the 
research and conceptualisation conducted in this respect are examples of 
this search. National constitutional law and practice will continue to play 
an important role in this development.
A second issue in the shift in the separation of powers as a con-
sequence of EU membership is the effect on the legislative powers of 
parliament when implementing EU legislation, mostly directives. When 
implementing directives, parliaments are no longer the ‘sovereign’ par-
liaments they used to be. They are bound by the limits imposed by the 
legislation to be implemented. In some Member States, the implementa-
tion of Community law is delegated to secondary legislatures. In Ireland, 
for example, this is done in the Constitution itself. Under that delegated 
77  Protocol No 9 on the role of national parliaments in the European Union (1997). The 
TECE contained two protocols on the role of national parliaments and on monitoring sub-
sidiarity and proportionality, encompassing the so-called ‘early warning mechanism’.
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power, the Government can issue secondary legislation, which can even 
amend primary legislation if this is necessitated by membership. In the 
Netherlands, the issue is now much debated, and may be taken up in the 
next round of constitutional amendment.
Specifi c provisions
Finally, several Member States have made changes to specifi c provi-
sions in the Constitution which were considered incompatible with the 
obligations of membership. The most obvious examples are voting rights 
for non-nationals (Spain, France, Belgium, Portugal, etc) and the intro-
duction of the euro (Germany, France, Portugal, Greece). This leaves 
aside the changes which may also be required to adapt to specifi c pieces 
of secondary legislation. The Framework Decision on the European Ar-
rest Warrant, for instance, called for constitutional amendment in those 
States where the extradition of nationals was constitutionally precluded 
(eg Germany and France). 
Conclusion: Lessons to be learned?  
A fi rst conclusion is empirical and follows from the overview of con-
stitutional provisions and constitutional law. National constitutional leg-
islatures have not been swift to respond to the new constitutional reali-
ties. These seem to be the dialectics of progress: several of the founding 
Member States still operate on the basis of the old constitutional provi-
sions, and also adapt very slowly in constitutional practice to the reali-
ties of membership, and to the shifts in constitutional balance that come 
with it, as is particularly the case with Belgium and the Netherlands. In 
part, this has to do with the fact that these countries are open to interna-
tional law in general,78 and accordingly no need was felt to adapt the Con-
stitution. Yet, there are indications that such negligence regarding the 
national Constitution may ricochet. Slow adaptation is obviously in the 
nature of Constitutions, which are entrenched and rigid and can only be 
amended by way of a diffi cult and lengthy process, often involving special 
majorities, and sometimes national elections and/or a referendum. Con-
stitutions are not meant to change easily. At the same time, the process 
of constitutional change has become almost a permanent process at the 
EU level, with IGCs and Treaty amendments following each other rapidly 
(Maastricht 1991; Amsterdam 1996; Nice 2000; Rome 2004). There is a 
tension here, and national Constitutions struggle to keep up with consti-
tutional change at the European level.
78  Nevertheless, contrary to what is often said, Belgium could not be characterised as mon-
ist before Franco-suisse le Ski. Opinions were split, and the case law of the ECJ tilted the 
balance in favour of monism.
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Second, national constitutions are, in principle, the province of the 
Member States, and it is for them to decide whether and how to adapt 
their Constitutions. Accordingly, there is a great deal of diversity in ad-
dressing the constitutional issues raised by membership. Nevertheless, 
some trends are visible. First, while several old Member States remain 
silent on the EU (the Netherlands, Spain) or mention the EU only mar-
ginally (Italy and Belgium), there is a trend to include Europe provisions 
in the national constitution. In addition, there is also a trend to make 
specifi c arrangements in constitutional practice and in legislation for 
adaptations to membership, such as parliamentary proceedings or im-
plementing mechanisms. This is to be welcomed, since it increases con-
stitutionalism at the national level, and indirectly also at the European 
level. It is not clear whether there are European requirements of ‘good 
constitutionalism’, and what these would be. At the very least, there are 
minimum conditions requiring the Member States to comply with the 
values of Article 6 EU and others mentioned in the Treaties. While these 
do not require national Constitutions to be adapted (as long as the result 
in achieved), in most Member States this would appear to be an element 
of compliance. Also, it is at least a matter of elegance to bring harmony 
between the national Constitution and the international obligations en-
tered into.
Third, the academic debate in national constitutional law and the 
EU still focuses on two main issues: the transfer of power provisions and 
the procedure to be followed at times of European constitutional change, 
ie Treaty amendment, and secondly, the case law of national courts to 
EU law and its relation with the national Constitution. The position on 
how governments are to be held to account, how parliaments should in-
fl uence EU decision-making, and how decentralised bodies are affected 
by EU legislation is still being developed. There is need for more research 
on these questions. In this respect, the national dimension of the con-
stitutionalisation of Europe can be said to be lagging behind. Indeed the 
search for constitutionalism in the European composite constitutional 
order and for the best rules, procedures and mechanisms to achieve it, 
must be conducted at the European and the national level. National Con-
stitutions must not be neglected in the process of the constitutionalisa-
tion of Europe.
